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Abstract
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the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Recent evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer 
programs for schooling are effective in raising school 
enrollment and attendance. However, there is also reason 
to believe that such programs can affect other outcomes, 
such as the sexual behavior of their young beneficiaries. 
Zomba Cash Transfer Program is a randomized, ongoing 
conditional cash transfer intervention targeting young 
women in Malawi that provides incentives (in the form 
of school fees and cash transfers) to current schoolgirls 
and recent dropouts to stay in or return to school. An 
average offer of US$10/month conditional on satisfactory 
school attendance—plus direct payment of secondary 
school fees—led to significant declines in early marriage, 
This paper—a product of the a product of the Poverty and Inequality Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to improve the design and cost-effectiveness of cash transfer programs and to assess their 
impacts for a wider range of policy-relevant outcomes. This working paper is based on an article that is forthcoming in 
“Health Economics”. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. Please 
send correspondence to bozler@worldbank.org.
teenage pregnancy, and self-reported sexual activity 
among program beneficiaries after just one year of 
program implementation. For program beneficiaries who 
were out of school at baseline, the probability of getting 
married and becoming pregnant declined by more than 
40 percent and 30 percent, respectively. In addition, the 
incidence of the onset of sexual activity was 38 percent 
lower among all program beneficiaries than the control 
group. Overall, these results suggest that conditional 
cash transfer programs not only serve as useful tools for 
improving school attendance, but may also reduce sexual 
activity, teen pregnancy, and early marriage. 
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1.  Introduction 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) can be an important component of social 
protection policy and there is “…considerable evidence that CCTs have improved the 
lives of poor people” (World Bank, 2009).  Early CCT pilots such as Mexico’s Progresa, 
Brazil’s Bolsa Escola, and Nicaragua’s Red de Protección have been popular and became 
national programs a few years later. As of 2007, “…29 developing countries had some 
type of CCT program in place (in some cases, more than one) and many other countries 
were planning one.” (World Bank, 2009) It seems that CCT programs are here to stay – at 
least for the foreseeable future. 
However, such programs have been largely evaluated on a small set of outcomes, 
which have more to do with the behavior that the program is being “conditioned” on 
(such as school enrollment), rather than, say, learning or labor market outcomes. 
Naturally, there is now an increased focus, from policy-makers and researchers alike, on 
examining a broader set of outcomes that might be plausibly affected by these programs 
and that are pertinent for policy design. The contribution of this paper is to extend the 
analysis of CCT programs to a new context and a novel set of outcomes; namely their 
potential to prevent risky sexual behavior among school-age girls and young women in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
When available, evidence as to the impact of CCT programs on “final” 
educational outcomes such as test scores, shows only modest effects (World Bank, 2009). 
More importantly for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), very little is known about the possible 
effect of these programs on the sexual behavior of the target beneficiaries, including age 3 
 
of marriage and fertility decisions.
4 Given the close link between sexual behavior and 
HIV infection, and given the burden HIV poses on these economies, this is potentially a 
very important impact to document. 
There are good reasons to think that CCT programs for schooling may affect the 
sexual behavior of young people. Education has been suggested as a “social vaccine” to 
change sexual behavior and prevent the spread of HIV (Jukes, Simmons, and Bundy, 
2008), but almost all of the evidence we have on this comes from cross-sectional studies. 
Furthermore, the role of income (especially that of women’s poverty) has often been cited 
as a significant factor in the spread of HIV in SSA, but again there is little credible 
evidence showing a causal link between income, sexual behavior, and HIV risk. Given 
the higher prevalence of HIV infection among young women in SSA (3.2% among 
women aged 15-24 vs. 1.1% among men in the same age group (UNAIDS, 2008)), the 
policy importance of identifying any potentially large impacts of CCT programs for 
schooling on sexual behavior cannot be overstated. 
This paper aims to provide new causal evidence on the effects of a CCT program 
(with only school attendance used as a condition to receive the transfers) on the self-
reported sexual behavior of the young, female beneficiaries of the program. It does so by 
examining the one-year impacts of an ongoing two-year randomized intervention in 
Malawi that provides cash transfers to young women to stay in (or return to) school. 
Conditional cash transfers blend ‘income’ effects (through the transfers themselves) with 
‘price’ effects (through the conditionality), and our study estimates the joint effect of 
these two policy parameters. As such, this paper provides the first experimental evidence 
                                                 
4 We know of one other study (Duflo et. al., 2006) that examines the effect of providing school uniforms on 
the likelihood of teen marriage and childbearing. The implied transfer size for that study is significantly 
lower than the transfers in the program being evaluated here. 4 
 
on the impact of a CCT program for schooling on age at first marriage, childbearing, 
frequency of sexual activity, and risky sexual behaviors in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature on conditional cash transfer programs and on the relationship 
between schooling, sexual behavior and HIV risk. Section 3 describes the survey setting 
and why this study is particularly pertinent for Malawi, while Section 4 details the 
research design and the intervention. Section 5 describes the impact of the program and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
CCT programs are utilized around the world with two main objectives: to provide 
poor households with a minimum threshold of income (reduce poverty in the very short-
run) and to improve the accumulation of human capital for the next generation (reduce 
poverty in the longer-run). There is a large body of evidence supporting the success of 
CCTs throughout most of the developing world, particularly in relationship to schooling 
(de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2004; Schultz, 2004).
5 Moreover, several evaluations show that 
these programs are both technically feasible (i.e. the stated goals of the program are 
actually met in practice) and are politically acceptable in that successive governments are 
willing to continue and even expand program coverage (Das, Do, Özler, 2005).  
CCTs targeted at education generally consist of giving cash to poor parents under 
the condition that they send their children to school. Households are generally targeted 
using means testing based on observable characteristics. In Mexico’s Progresa, for 
example, cash transfers were offered to poor mothers in rural communities conditional on 
                                                 
5 See World Bank (2009) for a recent and thorough examination of CCT programs. 5 
 
their children using health facilities on a regular basis and attending school between the 
third year of primary school and the third year of secondary school (de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2004).   
World Bank (2009) finds that CCTs led to large increases in school enrollment, 
particularly among those with low enrollment rates to begin with. However, evidence on 
the impact of educational transfer programs (in kind or in cash) on ‘final outcomes’ such 
as test scores, is not as encouraging (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Glewwe, Kremer, and 
Moulin, 2008). Filmer and Schady (2009) argue that the lack of any discernible effect of 
such programs on learning (despite large impacts on school enrollment) may be due to 
the fact that they draw lower ability students back to school.  
To our knowledge, no CCT program for schooling has been evaluated to assess its 
possible impact on the sexual behavior of the young people benefiting from the program. 
This is the case even though there are good reasons to think that the impacts of such 
programs on the sexual behavior of young people may be substantial. The World Bank 
(2009) argues that among the areas that should receive high priority in impact evaluations 
(and, more generally, research) on CCTs is the role they play in reducing the transmission 
of HIV, most likely through changes in sexual behavior. Both schooling and poverty 
reduction (especially for women) are seen by many as key components in a 
comprehensive strategy to combat HIV/AIDS. However, causal evidence that links 
increased schooling or income to changes in behaviors associated with HIV is very 
limited. Most of what we know about the relationship between schooling (attendance or 
attainment) or income and HIV risk factors come from cross-sectional studies.  6 
 
While several studies find a positive, cross-sectional correlation between school 
attendance and HIV status (e.g. Hargreaves et. al., 2008; Beegle and Özler, 2007), there 
is only one study that points to a possible causal link between school attendance and 
reduced HIV risk factors. A study in Kenya finds that reducing the cost of schooling (by 
paying for uniforms) reduced dropout rates, teen marriage, and childbearing (Duflo et. al. 
2006). Commenting on the lack of clear and credible evidence addressing the relationship 
between education and HIV, Jukes, Simmons, and Bundy (2008) suggest that long-term, 
follow-up experimental interventions to improve educational access, such as conditional 
cash transfer programs, offer the potential to examine the causal relationship between 
educational attainment, sexual behavior and subsequent risk of HIV infection. 
Credible causal evidence regarding the effect of increased income on risky sexual 
behavior among young people is also practically non-existent. The evidence on whether 
poorer individuals are more likely to conduct risky sexual behavior and contract HIV, 
virtually all of which is cross-sectional, is mixed. Many are quick to assert that poverty is 
a determinant of HIV status for women because poor women are more likely to engage in 
risky sexual activities, such as commercial or informal sex work (Wojcicki, 2002; World 
Bank, 2005; Shelton, Cassell, and Adetunji, 2005), have multiple partners (Wines, 2004; 
Halperin and Epstein, 2004; Hallman, 2004), or have riskier types of sex for money 
(Robinson and Yeh, 2006). On the other hand, Swidler and Watkins (2007) argue that it’s 
not women’s poverty but the relative wealth of men that is the cause of transactional sex, 
and as such improving women’s economic circumstances are unlikely to decrease 
women’s vulnerability to HIV infection. 7 
 
However, many of the same sources asserting the plausibility of the relationship 
between poverty and HIV are puzzled to report evidence to the contrary. For example, 
Shelton, Cassell, and Adetunji (2005) report a positive correlation between household 
possessions and HIV prevalence in Tanzania. Examining the determinants of HIV in five 
countries with DHS data in Sub-Saharan Africa, De Walque (2006) finds that wealth 
(measured by an asset index) is positively correlated with HIV status in three of the five 
countries, especially for females.
6 Finally, using prime-age adult mortality as a proxy 
measure for HIV/AIDS affected households; several studies find that higher income 
households are more likely to suffer an adult death (Yamano and Jayne, 2004; World 
Bank, 2006, among others). 
HIV/AIDS is an important problem in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially among 
young women. CCT programs are now starting to be seriously considered for 
implementation in the region, with a number of countries piloting or implementing such 
schemes. There are good reasons to think that such programs may play a role in affecting 
the incidence of HIV infection among young people through behavioral change, as sexual 
behavior might reasonably be linked to both schooling and income. However, credible 
empirical evidence is lacking to establish such a causal relationship. This paper, which 
reports the findings from a prospective evaluation of a randomized CCT program, is well-
suited to attempt to fill some of this knowledge gap. 
 
3.  Study Setting 
Malawi, the setting for this research project, is an impoverished small country in 
southern Africa. Its population of almost 14 million in 2007 is overwhelmingly rural, 
                                                 
6 De Walque and Corno (2007) report a similar positive conditional correlation in Lesotho. 8 
 
with most people living from subsistence farming supplemented by small-scale income-
generating opportunities that are typically more available to men than they are to women. 
The country is poor even by African standards: the GNI per capita (PPP, current 
international $) is $750 in 2007, compared to an average of $1,870 for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Bank, 2008).
7 Malawi also has the eighth-highest HIV prevalence in the 
world with 14 percent of the adult population infected (UNAIDS, 2007).
8 The gender gap 
in HIV prevalence among young adults, aged 15-24, is startling: prevalence was more 
than four times higher for females than males in 2004.  
Primary schools in Malawi are free through Standard 8, and upon completing this 
grade, students take the Primary School Leaving Certificate (PSLC) exam. Access to 
secondary schools is rationed, meaning that only those who obtain sufficiently high 
scores on the PSLC will gain access, and only if they can pay the tuition fees. Secondary 
students sit one exam after two years (the Junior Certificate Exam, or JCE) and a final 
exam on completion of secondary school (the Malawi Schools Certificate Exam, or 
MSCE). Each of these exams is nationally recognized and considered an important 
qualification on the labor market. 
The CCT intervention that is the subject of this paper takes place in one district of 
Malawi, which both reduces project costs (lower fixed costs of office infrastructure and 
transport) and increases data quality through more careful supervision. Zomba district in 
the Southern region of Malawi was chosen as the site for this study for several reasons. 
First, it has a large enough population within a small enough geographic area rendering 
                                                 
7 Using the Atlas method, The GNI per capita (in current US$) in Malawi is 250 in 1997, compared with 
952 in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. 
8 The UNAIDS HIV estimate of 14.1 percent is close to the Demographic and Health Survey 2004 (NSO, 
2005) estimate of 12.7 percent (National Statistical Office and ORC Macro, 2005). 9 
 
field work logistics easier and keeping transport costs lower. Second, characteristic of 
Southern Malawi, Zomba has a high rate of school dropouts and low educational 
attainment. Finally, HIV/AIDS rates of women aged 15-49 in Zomba are the highest in 
the country at 24.6% (NSO, 2005). 
Because of Zomba district’s particular characteristics with respect to its relatively 
high poverty and HIV prevalence, one might worry that the findings from this study may 
not be relevant for other parts of Malawi or for neighboring countries. We feel that 
several factors mitigate these concerns. First, while Zomba district may be different than 
the rest of the country, it certainly is quite representative of the Southern Region (one of 
the three major regions of Malawi), which is home to two of the country’s three biggest 
cities (Blantyre and Zomba). As the Southern Region is the poorest one in the country 
with low educational outcomes and high HIV rates, it would be a natural place for the 
government to implement a similar program were it to consider geographic targeting. 
Second, unlike many other districts, Zomba has the advantage of having a true urban 
center as well as rural areas.
9 Finally, Zomba and the Southern region of Malawi are not 
atypical of the many other environments in Southern Africa which share high poverty and 
HIV rates. Therefore, while we study a particular population (never married girls, aged 
13-22 at baseline), we feel confident that our results are meaningful for this population in 
other contexts in Southern Africa. 
 
4.  Research Design and Intervention 
                                                 
9 The study sample was stratified to get random representative samples from urban areas (Zomba town), 
rural areas near Zomba town, and distant rural areas in the district. 10 
 
This paper is evaluating the impact of a randomized conditional cash transfer 
intervention targeting young women in Malawi that provides incentives (in the form of 
school fees and cash transfers) to current schoolgirls and young women who have 
recently dropped out of school to stay in or return to school.
10  Between October 2007 
and January 2008, baseline surveys were conducted with 3,805 girls in 176 Enumeration 
Areas (EAs) in Zomba district of Malawi. These EAs were selected from the universe of 
EAs produced by the National Statistics Office of Malawi from the 1998 Census. The 
sample of EAs was stratified by distance to the nearest township or trading centre. The 
random sample of 176 EAs consists of 29 EAs in Zomba town, 8 trading centers in 
Zomba rural, 111 population areas within 16 kilometers of Zomba town, and 28 EAs 
more than 16 kilometers from Zomba town. 
The 3,805 girls were selected based on information collected during a listing 
exercise, which involved going door to door to all households in these 176 EAs. This 
listing exercise identified all never-married, 13-22 year-old females living in the area. 
This age group was chosen because it represents the period during which school dropout 
coincides with the onset of sexual activity, and therefore maximizes the power for a 
causal study of the relationship between these two phenomena. For the study, we sampled 
all dropouts and 75-100% of current school girls, where the exact percentage sampled 
depended on the age of the school-girl; regression results are re-weighted to make them 
representative of the entire eligible frame.
11 A baseline ‘dropout’ was any girl or young 
                                                 
10  We selected only females for the treatment because the expected HIV prevalence among males of the 
same age cohort is much smaller, making it unlikely that we could detect program impacts with any kind of 
precision.  The HIV prevalence for males aged 15-24 is 2.7%, compared with 8.4% for females of the same 
age (UNAIDS, 2008). 
11 These percentages were lower for urban areas since average population in urban areas is much higher 
than that in rural areas. 11 
 
woman, who was out of school at baseline – regardless of how long she had been out of 
school prior to the study as long as she had never been married and was between the ages 
of 13-22. This sampling procedure led to an average sample size of 5.1 dropouts and 16.6 
school girls at baseline in each EA.
12 
Out of these 3,805 young women, 1,225 girls in 88 randomly selected EAs were 
sampled to be part of the CCT program.
13 Treatment status was assigned at the EA level 
and therefore we cluster all standard errors to reflect this design effect. A household 
questionnaire (not unlike a Living Standards Measurement Survey, or LSMS) was 
administered to our entire core sample – both treatment and control – at baseline and 
follow-up, which were conducted 12 months apart. This survey, described in more detail 
below, includes information on household characteristics, school enrollment, sexual 
behavior, and social networks. 
From December 2007 through January 2008 offers to participate in the CCT 
program were made to the selected girls in treatment villages.  Of the 942 girls in the 
baseline survey to whom we attempted to make conditional offers, 17 could not be 
located, 32 were deemed ineligible subsequent to the offer process, and one refused.  
Because we continue to code all 50 of these ‘non-compliers’ as treated, we effectively 
estimate the Intention to Treat Effect of the original intent to offer the treatment
14.  As 
                                                 
12 We chose to target these two groups separately to ensure that we had a significant number of dropouts in 
our sample. Treating all dropouts gives our study the statistical power to focus on a sub-population whose 
school enrollment rates are more sensitive to the offer to participate in the program. 
13 283 of these girls resided in EAs where the offers for baseline schoolgirls were not conditional on school 
attendance, and, as such, are not part of the analysis for this paper. In addition, 629 girls in treatment EAs 
were randomly selected to not receive cash transfers in order to examine possible spillover effects of the 
program. These girls are also not part of the analysis in this paper. This leaves us with a final sample size of 
2,893 girls at baseline, for whom the treatment is always conditional on school attendance. 
14 Due to uncertainties regarding funding, the initial offers were only made for the 2008 school year. 
However, upon receipt of more funds for the intervention in April 2008, all the girls in the program were 12 
 
part of the offer, a detailed informational sheet was given to each household that 
described the conditions of the contract. This information sheet also informed recipients 
that secondary school fees would be paid directly to their school in full.
15 The contract 
was then signed by both the recipients (parent/guardian and core respondent) and the 
NGO delivering the funds. 
The average offer to the households consisted of $10/month – for a total of $100 
for the school year transferred in equal amounts for 10 months.
16 $10/month represents 
roughly 15% of total monthly household consumption in our sample households at 
baseline, which places this program in the middle-to-high end of the range of relative 
transfer sizes for conditional cash transfer programs elsewhere.
17 In addition to the 
transfers to the household, secondary school fees were paid directly to the schools upon 
confirmation of enrollment.
18 The transfer was split into a component that went to the 
student’s guardian and a component that went directly to the girl herself, with an average 
of 30% of the transfer given to the schoolgirl. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
informed that the program would be extended to cover the 2009 school year and that they could stay in the 
program upon satisfactory school attendance . 
15 This was the case only for public schools. An upper limit for school fee payments was established for 
those attending private schools, which was set to equal the average public school fees in the program 
sample. 
16 The intervention being evaluated here is part of a larger experiment with multiple treatment arms, 
wherein transfer size was randomly varied across treatment units as well as the transfers randomly split 
between parents and the young women. To measure possible spillover effects, the percentage of young 
women treated in each EA was also randomly varied. Finally, baseline schoolgirls in a randomly selected 
small percentage of the EAs received unconditional offers, meaning that the transfers were not conditional 
on school attendance, or any other behavior other than showing up to collect monthly payments, for these 
beneficiaries in those EAs. The analysis of the heterogeneity of the impacts with respect to each of these 
design features is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we aim to establish the average effect of the 
conditional treatment arms, which may not equal the treatment effect of the average treatment if these 
impacts are nonlinear.  For a more detailed discussion of this contract variation, see Baird et al (2009). 
17 For example, Cambodia transfers as little as 2-3% of total monthly household consumption under its 
CESSP Scholarship Program (Filmer and Schady, 2009), while Mexico provides over 20% under Progresa. 
18 Students have to pay school fees at the secondary level in Malawi, but not at the primary level. 13 
 
4.1. Implementation of transfers 
The cash payments take place monthly at centrally located and well-known 
places, such as churches and schools. The cash transfer points were selected so that no 
recipient has to travel for more than 5 kilometers to the cash payment point.
19 At each 
meeting some basic information is collected for each sample respondent, such as who is 
picking up the money (girl or parent/guardian), how far they had to travel, etc. In between 
payment dates, the NGO collects attendance records for all the students in the program to 
make sure that they are complying with the program requirements and attending school.
20  
Each household receives the transfer only if the young woman attended school for at least 
75% of the days that their school was in session in the previous month.  
 
4.2. Survey Instrument 
The annual SIHR Household Survey consists of a multi-topic questionnaire that is 
administered to the households in which the selected sample respondents reside. 
Although it is described as a household questionnaire, the primary goal of the SIHR 
Household Survey is to collect detailed information from the individual respondents 
selected for the survey. The survey consists of two parts: Part I is administered to the 
head of the household, while Part II is administered to the core respondent, i.e. the 
                                                 
19 Some recipients who still live in locations that are remote are visited door-to-door by the NGO 
implementing the transfer scheme. 
20 The total cost of the program consists of the cash transfers themselves, as well as the administrative costs 
of running the program. For every $1 that is transferred to a program beneficiary, approximately $0.50 is 
spent on administrative costs. The main items under the administrative costs are delivering the cash 
payments and monitoring attendance, both of which are underlined by large costs of transportation. We 
estimate that a similar program implemented by the government itself would spend significantly less on 
administrative costs. This is because the cash transfers could be conducted at schools and the program 
administers could rely on school records (with spot checks) to monitor attendance, significantly reducing 
transport costs and producing scale economies. Furthermore, the government would benefit from collecting 
less research-oriented data during cash transfers, which takes significant time to collect and enter. 14 
 
sampled girl from our target population. Part I collects information on the household 
roster, dwelling characteristics, household assets and durables, consumption (food and 
non-food), household access to safety nets, and shocks (economic, health, and otherwise) 
experienced by the household. In Part II, the core respondent provides further information 
about her family background, her education and labor market participation, her health, 
her dating patterns, sexual behavior, marital expectations, knowledge of HIV/AIDS, her 
social networks, as well as her own consumption of girl-specific goods (such as soaps, 
mobile phone airtime, clothing, braids, sodas and alcoholic drinks, etc.). This paper 
utilizes baseline and follow-up data to analyze the one-year impact of the program on the 
marital status, childbearing, and the detailed sexual behavior for the program participants.  
The first round of the survey was administered from October 2007 to February 2008, and 
the second wave from October 2008 to February 2009.  
 
5.  Program Impacts  
5.1. Balance and Attrition 
Before examining the short-term impacts of the CCT program on sexual behavior, 
it is important to first confirm that our randomization, with respect to key outcomes and 
controls, was successful. Table 1a provides some basic summary statistics from baseline 
data. Table 1b shows the success of the randomization. As per our research design, we 
always compare treatment and control groups for dropouts and schoolgirls at baseline 
separately, and hence the equality of means at baseline is also examined within each of 
these two important sub-groups. Across the thirteen variables that are most pertinent for 
this paper, there are no significant differences at baseline between the treatment and 15 
 
control groups for those who were dropouts at baseline. Among baseline school girls, the 
only variable that is significantly different between treatment and control is whether the 
girl resides in a female headed household, where those in treatment are significantly less 
likely to reside in a female headed household. The fact that these variables look very 
similar across treatment and control is strong evidence that the randomization procedure 
was implemented successfully.
21 
Table 2 shows that the success rate in tracking our respondents in the study 
sample was more than 93% in the one-year follow-up. Since the small attrition from the 
panel data is balanced across treatment and control groups, it will not introduce any bias 
into the estimation of treatment impacts. Given these attrition rates, we move to the 
analysis with a panel sample consisting of 396 treatment and 408 control girls who had 
dropped out of school as of baseline, and 480 treatment and 1,408 control girls in school 
as of baseline. This gives us a total sample size of 2,692. 
We now turn to the impacts of the program, using a standard difference-in-
difference estimation strategy.  The specification used for estimation is:  
(*) idt i t d t idt YT      , 
where i indexes individuals, d indexes Enumeration Areas, and t indexes each of the two 
waves of the survey. Then i   represents a set of individual-level fixed effects,  t   is a 
dummy variable for the second round, and the interaction term ( * ) dt T   is another 
dummy variable that is equal to unity only for units offered the treatment in the second 
round. Standard errors are clustered at the EA (village) level because this is the unit at 
                                                 
21 The reader may also take note of the significant differences between schoolgirls and dropouts at baseline 
in Table 1. Dropouts at baseline are older, less literate, and more likely to have started childbearing. As 
described in Section 4, the intervention is randomly assigned within each of these two strata. 16 
 
which the treatment is administered (see Bruhn & McKenzie, 2008), and observations are 
weighted by the inverse of their village-level probability of being sampled. The 
coefficient  ˆ   therefore gives the intention-to-treat effect of the program on the average 
girl in our study EAs.
22  
 
5.2. School Enrollment 
We start by showing the impact of the program on self-reported schooling 
outcomes since we would be much less likely to find impacts on early marriage, fertility, 
and the sexual behavior of the young beneficiaries of the CCT program in the absence of 
any program impacts on school attendance and attainment. The simple act of attending 
school may be enough to cause sexual behavior change among the study beneficiaries – 
for example by raising the opportunity cost of pregnancy (Jukes, Bundy, and Simmons, 
2008; Duflo et. al. 2006).
23 
Table 3 shows that the program led to large increases in school enrollment, 
especially among those who were not in school at baseline. Column 2 of Table 3 shows 
that the percentage of initial dropouts who returned to school (and were in school at the 
end of the 2008 school year) was 17.2% among the control group compared with 61.4% 
                                                 
22 While the transfer amounts were randomly varied for the parents (from $4/month to $10/month across 
EAs) and the students (from $1/month and $5/month within each EA), here we present the average impacts 
of these heterogeneous treatments for the sample that received the transfers conditional on school 
attendance. Under a linearity assumption, this average effect will give the intention-to-treat effect (ITE) of 
the average CCT amount ($10/month) and the average share of the transfer going to the girl (30%). 
23 What is learned at school and schooling attainment can also influence sexual behavior of young people 
through a variety of channels. While we find some evidence that baseline dropouts show a significant 
improvement in self-reported literacy in English, we don’t find any evidence that their knowledge of 
HIV/AIDS or their likelihood of being tested for HIV improved. We conclude that the reduction in self-
reported sexual activity in the upcoming sub-sections is likely not a result of what is learned at school, but 
the incentives associated with staying in school. This is consistent with Duflo et al. (2006) who suggest that 
young women want to delay childbearing and marriage until after they complete their desired level of 
schooling. 17 
 
among treatment. Thus, program beneficiaries were 3-4 times more likely to be in school 
at the end of the 2008 school year than the control group.
24 Since those enrolled in school 
actually report attending school over 90% of the time, these treatment effects on 
enrollment do translate into improvements in actual days of school attended. 
For the stratum containing baseline schoolgirls, i.e. those who were still in school 
at baseline, while the absolute numbers are smaller (due to high rates of continued 
schooling among this group), the relative impact is still impressive (column 3). Among 
the control group, 89.1% of initial schoolgirls were still enrolled in school at the end of 
the 2008 school year, compared with 93% in the treatment group. Thinking of these as 
dropout rates, the CCT program reduced the dropout rate among this group by 35% -- 
from 10.9% among controls to 7% among treatments.  
 
5.3. Marriage and Fertility 
We now turn to early marriage and teen pregnancy as indicators of sexual 
activity.
25 Table 4 presents the impact of the program on having never been married. 
Early marriage increases coital frequency, significantly decreases condom use, and 
virtually eliminates the ability to abstain from sex (Clark, 2004). As described earlier, the 
study sample was selected to be never-married at baseline, so levels of marriage are equal 
to the incidence during 2008. We see that 27.7% of initial dropouts in the control group 
have gotten married during the past year, compared with only 16.4% of the same group in 
                                                 
24 The school enrollment and attainment data are self-reported by the study respondents. However, the 
school enrollment and attendance of program beneficiaries, i.e. the treatment group, was monitored as part 
of the program and can be confirmed. Full enrollment, attendance, school grades, and performance at 
national examinations will become available for the entire study sample after we complete conducting a 
school census in Zomba between February and May, 2009. 
25 The reader may object to marriages in this study being described as ‘early’ and pregnancies as ‘teenage’. 
While it is true that the study sample does include some over the age of 19, this is a small percentage (less 
than 12% at the end of Year 1) of the sample. 18 
 
treatment (column 2). This is a reduction in the marriage rate of more than 40% among 
those who were not in school at baseline. However, we also note that the program had no 
effect on the propensity to get married among the baseline schoolgirls – 4.7% of whom 
got married both among the controls and treatments. 
Table 5 describes the impact of the program on the incidence of childbearing – i.e. 
the likelihood of ever being pregnant. Column 2 shows that baseline dropouts among the 
treatment group are 5.1 percentage points less likely to have become pregnant over the 
past year, a reduction of more than 30% that is statistically significant at the 5% level.   
Again, as with marriage, the CCT program had no impact on the incidence of 
childbearing at follow-up for baseline schoolgirls.  
 
5.4. Sexual Activity and Risk Behaviors:  
Finally, we present impacts on self-reported sexual activity and risky behaviors. 
Table 6a examines onset of sexual activity and the number of sexual partners in the past 
12 months. At baseline, 29.6% of initial dropouts and 79.4% of initial schoolgirls 
reported having never had sex. Columns 2-3 of Table 6a indicate that the reduction in the 
onset of sexual activity is 5.5 percentage points among initial dropouts (significant at the 
1% level)  and 2.5 percentage points among initial schoolgirls (with a p-value of 0.112), 
which represent reductions in the onset of sexual activity of 46.6% and 31.3%, 
respectively. Columns 5-6 complement this finding and show that the change in the 
number of self-reported number of lifetime partners from baseline to follow-up is smaller 
for the program beneficiaries. The decrease in the number of lifetime partners is 
approximately 25% lower for both initial dropouts and schoolgirls, although the 19 
 
difference is only statistically significant among baseline dropouts. These results suggest 
that program beneficiaries reduce their (self-reported) sexual activity by both delaying 
sexual activity and reducing the number of sexual partners. Table 6b extends the analysis 
by examining the sub-sample of young women who haven’t yet gotten married by Round 
2 and finds similar impacts – suggesting that the reduction in self-reported sexual activity 
is not due solely to delayed marriage in this population. 
Table 7 reports the impact of the program on the sexual behavior of those who are 
sexually active at both baseline and follow-up: condom use, frequency of sexual activity, 
and having sex with older partners. As the program has both an effect on the extensive 
margin, i.e. on being sexually active in follow-up, and on the intensive margin, i.e. the 
safety of the sexual activity conditional on being sexually active, we face an 
identification problem for the latter. Hence, we ask the following question: “For the 
population of young women who would be sexually active in the absence of the program, 
what would the effect of the program have been on their sexual behavior?” However, the 
young women we observe to be sexually active in both rounds include both this group, 
and the group who would have stopped being sexually active had they received the 
intervention, which introduces a selection bias that prevents us from interpreting the 
simple difference-in-differences estimates that are presented in Table 7 as the marginal 
effect of treatment on the population in question.  
In columns 1-3 of Table 7, we examine self-reported condom use and find no 
discernible impact of the program. In columns 4-6, we present the likelihood of having 
sexual intercourse at least once a week. We find that treatment baseline schoolgirls are 
significantly less likely to have sexual intercourse on a weekly basis, but we find no 20 
 
significant impact for baseline dropouts. Similarly, the likelihood of having an older 
sexual partner is lowered significantly for baseline schoolgirls in treatment (columns 7-
9). If we believe that the treatment girls who stopped having sex had a lower propensity 
to engage in risky sexual behaviors, then the protective effects of the program found here 
are likely to be stronger, and vice versa.
26 
 
6.  Conclusions  
While there have been several evaluations of the impact CCT programs have on 
school attainment, learning, early childhood development, as well as adult health, no one, 
to our knowledge, has studied the possible effect of these programs on the sexual 
behavior of the young target beneficiaries. This is potentially a very important impact to 
document in Sub-Saharan Africa, where CCT programs are likely to become more 
common in the near future and the risk of HIV infection is disproportionately high among 
young women and school-aged girls.  
Causal evidence that links increased schooling or income to changes in sexual 
behavior is very limited. While most of what we know about these relationships comes 
from cross-sectional studies, the existing evidence is still at least suggestive of the 
possibility that CCT programs for schooling may also affect the sexual behavior of their 
young beneficiaries. This paper aims to shed some light on this question by analyzing the 
short-term impacts of such a randomized CCT program implemented in Malawi. 
The results are promising. After one year, the program led to large increases in 
self-reported school enrollment, as well as declines in early marriage, teenage pregnancy, 
                                                 
26 We have also tried to ‘bound’ our estimates using “Lee bounds” (Lee, 2005) to deal with this selection 
effect, but as the impact of the program on the extensive margin is substantial, the bounds are too wide to 
be useful. 21 
 
sexual activity, and risky sexual behavior. The evidence presented here suggests that as 
girls and young women returned to (or stayed in) school, they significantly delayed the 
onset (and, for those already sexually active, reduced the frequency) of their sexual 
activity. The program also delayed marriage – which is the main alternative for schooling 
for young women in Malawi – and reduced the likelihood of becoming pregnant. As the 
treatment/control differences in schooling become starker during the second year of the 
program, the treatment impacts on marriage, fertility, and risky sexual behavior are likely 
to become stronger. 
One should not assume that the changes in self-reported sexual behavior will 
result in a decline in HIV incidence among this cohort of program beneficiaries. Future 
rounds of household survey and Biomarker data collection will shed light on these 
questions. For now, however, schooling CCTs for young women in the context of poor 
Sub-Saharan countries with high HIV rates seem like “win-win” programs, as they may 
not only increase schooling for young women, but also significantly reduce their risk of 
HIV infection. Furthermore, increases in age at first marriage and pregnancy, as well as 
improved educational attainment may lead to improved outcomes for the next generation, 
as there are a host of negative externalities for children that are associated with early 
marriage, such as higher child mortality or lower educational attainment (Morrison and 
Sabarwal, 2008). The evidence presented in this paper provides impetus for the expansion 
of CCT programs (which already cover much of Latin America) to Sub-Saharan Africa. 22 
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics (N=2893)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 15.611 2.235 12 22
Father Alive 0.692 0.462 0 1
Mother Alive 0.808 0.394 0 1
Female Headed 0.338 0.473 0 1
Age Household Head 47.133 13.083 13 110
Household Size 6.333 2.300 1 15
Muslim 0.187 0.390 0 1
Urban Household 0.358 0.480 0 1
Read English 0.741 0.438 0 1
No Qualification 0.669 0.471 0 1
Ever pregnant 0.107 0.309 0 1
Never had sex 0.694 0.461 0 1
Number of partners 0.449 0.809 0 6
Table 1b: Equality of Means at Baseline
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Mean Difference Mean Difference
Age 17.434 -0.301 15.249 -0.199
Father Alive 0.646 0.004 0.696 0.019
Mother Alive 0.784 -0.038 0.834 -0.042
Female Headed 0.420 -0.004 0.351 -0.095***
Age Household Head 46.855 -0.502 47.775 -1.323
Household Size 6.091 0.011 6.433 -0.105
Muslim 0.225 -0.006 0.194 -0.045
Urban Household 0.194 -0.010 0.362 0.110
Read English 0.469 -0.065 0.829 -0.024
No Qualification 0.673 0.012 0.659 0.021
Ever pregnant 0.436 -0.020 0.021 0.008
Never had sex 0.309 -0.017 0.794 0.008
Number of partners 1.135 0.031 0.270 -0.015
*Denote significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
Dropouts (N=889) School Girl (N=2003)
Notes:  The entire sample was never married at baseline, so the control and 
treatment means were both zero.  Dropout and school girl refer to schooling 
status at baseline.   The sample was split into dropouts (girls not in school) and 
school girls at baseline, so the control and treatment means of schooling status 
were identical at baseline (dropouts were 100% not in school while school girls 
were 100% in school).  These means are weighted to make results representative 






=1 if Treatment Girl -0.001 0.010 0.008
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013)
Tracking Success 0.931*** 0.899*** 0.941***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
Number of observations 2,893 890 2,003
Table 2: Determinants of Survey Attrition
Note:  Each column represents an OLS regression with robust standard 
errors.   Standard errors in parentheses.  







Post-Treatment Indicator 0.124*** 0.442*** 0.038**
(0.018) (0.035) (0.019)
Round 2 Indicator -0.141*** 0.172*** -0.109***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Baseline mean of outcome in control 0.832 0.000 1.000
Number of observations 5,384 1,608 3,776
Number of individuals 2,692 804 1,888
Table 3:  Dependent Variable is Enrolled in School
g
clustered at the EA level, and are weighted to make results representative of 
all study EAs. Standard errors in parentheses. The first column controls for 
schooling status at baseline.  






Post-Treatment Indicator 0.023* 0.113*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.027) (0.013)
Round 2 Indicator -0.056*** -0.277*** -0.047***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.008)
Baseline mean of outcome in control 1.000 1.000 1.000
Number of observations 5,384 1,608 3,776
Number of individuals 2,692 804 1,888
Table 4:  Dependent Variable is Never Married
Note: All regressions use individual fixed effects with standard errors clustered 
at the EA level, and are weighted to make results representative of all study EAs. 
Standard errors in parentheses. The first column controls for schooling status at 
baseline.  








Post-Treatment Indicator -0.011 -0.051** -0.001
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015)
Round 2 Indicator 0.073*** 0.162*** 0.070***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
Baseline mean of outcome in control  0.093 0.444 0.022
Number of observations 5,382 1,608 3,774
Number of individuals 2,691 804 1,887
Table 5:  Dependent Variable is Ever Pregnant
Note: All regressions use individual fixed effects with standard errors 
clustered at the EA level, and are weighted to make results representative of 
all study EAs. Standard errors in parentheses.   The first column controls for 
schooling status at baseline.  











Post-Treatment Indicator 0.031** 0.055*** 0.024 -0.053** -0.112** -0.038
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.027) (0.048) (0.029)
Round 2 Indicator -0.082*** -0.118*** -0.080*** 0.176*** 0.428*** 0.170***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.031) (0.015)
Baseline mean of outcome in control 0.709 0.302 0.791 0.413 1.120 0.270
Number of observations 5,382 1,606 3,776 5,382 1,606 3,776









Post-Treatment Indicator 0.023** 0.032* 0.021 -0.041 -0.076* -0.033
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.025) (0.045) (0.029)
Round 2 Indicator -0.063*** -0.073*** -0.062*** 0.145*** 0.326*** 0.142***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014)
Baseline mean of outcome in control 0.735 0.310 0.805 0.366 1.090 0.247
Number of observations 4,882 1,320 3,562 4,882 1,320 3,562
Number of individuals 2,441 660 1,781 2,441 660 1,781
*Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
Table 6a:  Sexual Activity
Note: All regressions use individual fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the EA level, and are weighted to 
make results representative of all study EAs.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The first column controls for schooling 
status at baseline.  
=1 if Never Had Sex
Number of partners in the past 
12 months
Table 6b:  Sexual Activity for Unmarried Subsample
Number of partners in the past 









All Dropouts  School 
Girls






Post-Treatment Indicator -0.088 -0.254 0.039 -0.136* -0.048 -0.204* -0.071 0.043 -0.159*
(0.284) (0.266) (0.463) (0.075) (0.088) (0.106) (0.062) (0.079) (0.095)
Round 2 Indicator 0.079 0.356** 0.031 0.067 0.178*** 0.093 0.023 -0.035 0.057
(0.194) (0.174) (0.201) (0.054) (0.063) (0.058) (0.046) (0.049) (0.053)
Baseline mean of outcome in control 2.842 2.389 3.150 0.162 0.251 0.102 0.235 0.581 0.165
Number of observations 671 351 320 671 351 320 672 352 320
Number of individuals 336 176 160 336 176 160 336 176 160
*Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level
Table 7:  Risky Sexual Activity
Note: All regressions use individual fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the EA level, and are weighted to make results representative of all 
study EAs. Standard errors in parentheses.  The first column controls for schooling status at baseline.  
Average Condom Use
Share of Partners who are at 
Least One Year Older
=1 if Sexually Active at Least 
Once a Week